

**SECURITY-AWARE OPTIMIZATION OF INTELLIGENT IOT NETWORKS IN
SMART AGRICULTURE USING FEDERATED AI APPROACH: TRADE-OFFS
BETWEEN PERFORMANCE, RELIABILITY, AND TRUST**

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Abstract

This research introduces a novel security-aware optimization framework for intelligent Internet of Things (IoT) networks in smart agriculture, leveraging Federated Artificial Intelligence (AI) to address the critical trade-offs between performance, reliability, and trust. We formulate a multi-objective optimization problem that simultaneously maximizes network performance metrics while ensuring robust security guarantees and maintaining computational efficiency. The proposed Federated Security-Aware Optimization (FSAO) framework employs differential privacy, secure multi-party computation, and blockchain-based trust management to protect sensitive agricultural data while enabling collaborative learning across distributed agricultural sites. Our mathematical formulation incorporates threat modeling using game-theoretic approaches and implements Byzantine-resilient aggregation for federated learning. Extensive experiments across three agricultural testbeds with 1,500+ IoT devices demonstrate that FSAO achieves 89.7% attack detection accuracy with only 12.3% performance overhead, while maintaining 94.5% model accuracy under coordinated poisoning attacks. Statistical analysis confirms significant improvements in security metrics ($p < 0.001$) while preserving network performance within acceptable bounds. The framework establishes optimal operating points across the performance-reliability-trust trade-off space, providing practical guidelines for secure agricultural IoT deployments in real-world scenarios.

1. INTRODUCTION

The integration of IoT technologies in smart agriculture has revolutionized precision farming practices, yet it introduces significant security vulnerabilities that can compromise agricultural operations, data integrity, and food supply chains. Traditional security approaches often fail to address the unique constraints of agricultural IoT networks, including resource limitations, distributed deployment, and sensitivity of agricultural data.

1.1 Security Challenges in Agricultural IoT

Agricultural IoT networks face distinctive security challenges:

- **Data Sensitivity:** Crop yields, soil analysis, and farm operations constitute valuable intellectual property
- **Resource Constraints:** Limited computational power and energy resources for security protocols

- **Physical Accessibility:** Remote deployment increases vulnerability to physical attacks
- **Regulatory Compliance:** Agricultural data protection regulations and privacy requirements

1.2 Mathematical Problem Formulation

Let $N = \{N_1, N_2, \dots, N_m\}$ represent the set of agricultural IoT networks across different farms, each with local dataset \mathcal{D}_i . The security-aware optimization problem is formulated as:

Equation 1: Security Optimization Problem

$$\text{maximize over } (W, S): \mathcal{J}(W, S) = \lambda_p \mathcal{P}(W) - \lambda_s \mathcal{S}(W) + \lambda_t \mathcal{T}(S) \quad (1)$$

subject to:

- $W \in W_{\text{feasible}}$
- $S \in S_{\text{secure}}$
- $\mathcal{C}_{\text{perf}}(W, S) \leq C_{\text{max}}$
- $\mathcal{R}_{\text{trust}}(S) \geq R_{\text{min}}$

where:

- **W:** Model parameters across federated learning rounds
- **S:** Security configuration parameters
- **$\mathcal{P}(W)$:** Performance objective (accuracy, latency, throughput)
- **$\mathcal{S}(W)$:** Security risk measure
- **$\mathcal{T}(S)$:** Trust metric
- $\lambda_p, \lambda_s, \lambda_t$: Trade-off coefficients

The comprehensive security risk measure:

$$\mathcal{S}(W) = \alpha_1 \mathcal{S}_{\text{data}} + \alpha_2 \mathcal{S}_{\text{model}} + \alpha_3 \mathcal{S}_{\text{network}} \quad (2)$$

where:

$$\mathcal{S}_{\text{data}} = \mathbb{E}[\text{Data Leakage Risk}] \quad (3)$$

$$\mathcal{S}_{\text{model}} = \mathbb{E}[\text{Model Poisoning Impact}] \quad (4)$$

$$\mathcal{S}_{\text{network}} = \mathbb{E}[\text{Network Attack Success Rate}] \quad (5)$$

1.3 Contributions

This research makes several key contributions:

1. Federated Security-Aware Optimization framework for agricultural IoT networks
2. Mathematical formulation of performance-reliability-trust trade-offs
3. Game-theoretic threat modeling and Byzantine-resilient aggregation
4. Comprehensive security analysis under various attack scenarios

5. Practical deployment guidelines with optimal trade-off operating points

2. MATHEMATICAL FOUNDATIONS

2.1 Federated Learning Formulation

Definition 1: Federated Learning Optimization

Given M clients with local datasets $\{\mathcal{D}_1, \dots, \mathcal{D}_m\}$, the federated learning objective is:

$$\min \text{ over } w: \mathcal{L}(w) = \sum_{i=1}^M (|\mathcal{D}_i|/|\mathcal{D}|) \mathcal{L}_i(w) \quad (6)$$

where $\mathcal{L}_i(w) = \mathbb{E}_{(x,y) \sim \mathcal{D}_i} [\ell(w; x, y)]$ is the local loss function.

2.2 Differential Privacy

Definition 2: (ϵ, δ) -Differential Privacy

A randomized mechanism $\mathcal{M}: \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ satisfies (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy if for any two adjacent datasets D, D' and any subset $S \subseteq \mathcal{R}$:

$$\Pr[\mathcal{M}(D) \in S] \leq e^\epsilon \Pr[\mathcal{M}(D') \in S] + \delta \quad (7)$$

2.3 Game-Theoretic Security Modeling

Definition 3: Security Game

The interaction between defender (agricultural IoT system) and attacker is modeled as a Stackelberg game:

$$\mathcal{G} = (\{\text{Defender, Attacker}\}, \{\mathcal{A}_d, \mathcal{A}_a\}, \{u_d, u_a\}) \quad (8)$$

where $\mathcal{A}_d, \mathcal{A}_a$ are action sets and u_d, u_a are utility functions.

The defender's utility function:

$$u_d(ad, aa) = R_d(ad) - C_d(ad) - L_d(aa) \quad (9)$$

where R_d is reward, C_d is cost, and L_d is loss from attacks.

2.4 Trust Management

Definition 4: Trust Metric

The trust value T_{ij} between node i and j is computed as:

$$T_{ij} = \alpha T_{\text{direct}} + \beta T_{\text{indirect}} + \gamma T_{\text{historical}} \quad (10)$$

where T_{direct} is based on direct interactions, T_{indirect} from recommendations, and $T_{\text{historical}}$ from past behavior.

3. PROPOSED FEDERATED SECURITY-AWARE OPTIMIZATION FRAMEWORK

3.1 System Architecture




Figure 1: Federated Security-Aware Optimization architecture

The FSAO architecture consists of the following layers:

Layer 1: Local Models (Farm Level)

- Farm 1: Local Model
- Farm 2: Local Model
- Farm N: Local Model

Layer 2: Security Layer

- Differential Privacy Protection
- Attack Detection and Filtering
- Secure Communication Protocols

Layer 3: Byzantine-Resilient Aggregator

- Gradient Verification
- Outlier Detection
- Secure Aggregation

Layer 4: Global Model

- Federated Model Updates
- Performance Monitoring
- Security Assessment

Layer 5: Trust Blockchain

- Trust Score Recording
- Reputation Management

- Audit Trail

3.2 Security Mechanisms

3.2.1 Differential Privacy in Federated Learning

We implement Gaussian mechanism for gradient perturbation:

$$\tilde{g}_i = g_i + \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma^2 \Delta_2^2 I) \quad (11)$$

where Δ_2 is the L2-sensitivity of the gradient computation.

The privacy budget accounting uses Moments Accountant:

$$\alpha_{\mathcal{M}}(\lambda) = \log \mathbb{E}[\exp(\lambda \mathcal{M})] \quad (12)$$

3.2.2 Byzantine-Resilient Aggregation

We propose Median-based Trimmed Mean aggregation:

Algorithm 1: Byzantine-Resilient Aggregation

Procedure SecureAggregate($\{w_1, \dots, w_m\}, f$)

Input: Model parameters from M clients, maximum Byzantine clients f

For each parameter dimension j :

1. Sort values: $w_{(1)j} \leq w_{(2)j} \leq \dots \leq w_{(m)j}$
2. Remove f smallest and f largest values
3. Compute mean of remaining values:

$$\bar{w}_j = (1/(M-2f)) \sum_{i=f+1}^{M-f} w_{(i)j}$$

Return: \bar{w}

End Procedure

3.2.3 Blockchain-based Trust Management

The trust update mechanism:

$$T_i^{t+1} = (1 - \alpha)T_i^t + \alpha \cdot \text{reward}(\text{behavior}_i^t) \quad (13)$$

where α is the learning rate and reward function depends on node behavior.

3.3 Multi-Objective Optimization

We formulate the trade-off optimization using Pareto optimality:

$$\max \text{ over } x \in \mathcal{X}: [f_1(x), f_2(x), f_3(x)] \text{ (14)}$$

where:

- $f_1(x)$ = Performance (Accuracy, Latency) (15)
- $f_2(x)$ = Reliability (Availability, Consistency) (16)
- $f_3(x)$ = Trust (Security, Privacy) (17)

The weighted sum approach for scalarization:

$$F(x) = w_1f_1(x) + w_2f_2(x) + w_3f_3(x) \text{ (18)}$$

4. THREAT MODELING AND SECURITY ANALYSIS

4.1 Attack Scenarios

We consider comprehensive attack vectors:

Table 1: Agricultural IoT Attack Taxonomy

Attack Type	Target	Impact Level	Detection Difficulty	Mitigation Strategy
Data Poisoning	Training Data	High	High	Robust Aggregation
Model Poisoning	Global Model	Critical	Very High	Byzantine Resilience
Sybil Attack	Network Identity	Medium	Medium	Trust Management
Eavesdropping	Data Privacy	Medium	Low	Differential Privacy
Byzantine Attack	Consensus	High	High	Secure Aggregation
Model Inversion	Model Privacy	Medium	High	Privacy Preservation
Membership Inference	Data Privacy	Low	Medium	Differential Privacy

4.2 Game-Theoretic Analysis

The security game payoff matrix:

Table 2: Defender-Attacker Payoff Matrix

Defender Strategy	No Attack	Data Poisoning	Model Poisoning	Sybil Attack
Basic Security	(5, 0)	(-3, 4)	(-8, 7)	(-2, 3)
Differential Privacy	(4, 0)	(2, 1)	(-5, 5)	(3, 0)
Byzantine Resilience	(4, 0)	(3, 0)	(1, 2)	(2, 1)
FSAO (Proposed)	(4, 0)	(4, -1)	(3, -2)	(4, -1)

Theorem 1: Security Game Equilibrium

Under the proposed FSAO framework, there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where the defender's expected utility is maximized given the attacker's best response.

Proof: The security game is finite and zero-sum. By the Minimax Theorem, there exists a value V and mixed strategies σ_d^* , σ_a^* such that:

$$ud(\sigma_d^*, \sigma_a) \geq V \geq ud(\sigma_d, \sigma_a^*) \quad (19)$$

for all defender strategies σ_d and attacker strategies σ_a .

5. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP

5.1 Testbed Configuration

Table 3: Security Testbed Specifications

Testbed	Nodes	Attack Scenarios	Security Level	Data Sensitivity	Trust Requirements	Deployment Duration
Testbed A (Research)	450	Controlled	High	Medium	High	12 months
Testbed B (Commercial)	720	Real-world	Critical	High	Very High	18 months
Testbed C (Experimental)	330	Diverse	Medium	Low	Medium	9 months
Total	1500	Comprehensive	Multi-level	Varied	Diverse	13 months (avg)

5.2 Security Metrics

We define comprehensive security evaluation metrics:

- **Attack Detection Accuracy:** Proportion of correctly identified attacks
- **False Positive Rate:** Incorrect attack classifications
- **Privacy Loss:** Quantified using ϵ in differential privacy
- **Trust Accuracy:** Correlation between computed and actual trust values
- **Recovery Time:** Time to recover from successful attacks

5.3 Performance Overhead Assessment

The security-performance trade-off is quantified as:

$$\text{Overhead} = [(\text{Performance}_{\text{secure}} - \text{Performance}_{\text{baseline}}) / \text{Performance}_{\text{baseline}}] \times 100\% \quad (20)$$

6. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

6.1 Security Performance Under Attacks

Table 4: Attack Detection and Mitigation Performance

Attack Type	Detection Accuracy (%)	False Positive Rate (%)	Recovery Time (min)	Data Loss (%)	Performance Impact (%)	Security Effectiveness
Data Poisoning	94.2 ± 2.1	3.2 ± 1.1	8.3 ± 2.1	2.1 ± 0.8	12.3 ± 3.2	0.912
Model Poisoning	89.7 ± 3.4	4.5 ± 1.4	12.7 ± 3.2	3.8 ± 1.2	15.6 ± 4.1	0.867
Sybil Attack	96.8 ± 1.8	2.1 ± 0.9	5.2 ± 1.4	1.2 ± 0.5	8.7 ± 2.3	0.945
Eavesdropping	98.3 ± 0.9	1.2 ± 0.6	3.1 ± 0.8	0.5 ± 0.2	6.4 ± 1.8	0.978
Byzantine Attack	92.4 ± 2.7	3.8 ± 1.2	9.8 ± 2.5	2.7 ± 0.9	13.9 ± 3.7	0.889
Model Inversion	87.6 ± 3.8	5.3 ± 1.7	15.3 ± 4.1	4.5 ± 1.5	18.2 ± 4.9	0.834
Average	93.2 ± 2.5	3.4 ± 1.2	9.1 ± 2.4	2.5 ± 1.0	12.5 ± 3.3	0.904

6.2 Performance-Security Trade-offs

Table 5: Performance-Security Trade-off Analysis

Security Level	Model Accuracy (%)	Latency (ms)	Privacy (ε)	Attack Success Rate (%)	Trust Score	Trade-off Index
No Security	95.6 ± 1.2	45.3 ± 3.2	∞	89.4 ± 4.2	0.45 ± 0.12	0.234
Basic Encryption	94.2 ± 1.4	67.8 ± 4.5	15.6 ± 2.3	45.6 ± 3.8	0.67 ± 0.15	0.512
Differential Privacy	92.8 ± 1.7	89.4 ± 5.7	3.2 ± 0.8	23.4 ± 2.9	0.78 ± 0.13	0.689
Byzantine Resilience	91.3 ± 1.9	112.3 ± 6.9	8.9 ± 1.5	12.7 ± 2.1	0.85 ± 0.11	0.756
FSAO (Balanced)	90.1 ± 2.1	134.5 ± 8.2	1.8 ± 0.4	6.8 ± 1.4	0.92 ± 0.08	0.845
FSAO (High Security)	87.6 ± 2.4	178.9 ± 10.3	0.9 ± 0.2	2.3 ± 0.8	0.96 ± 0.05	0.912




Figure 2: Performance-Security-Trust trade-off analysis

6.3 Statistical Significance Testing

Table 6: Statistical Significance of Security Improvements

Comparison	t-statistic	p-value	Effect Size (Cohen's d)	Power (1-β)	Significance
FSAO vs No Security	24.67	< 0.001	2.89	0.999	Highly Significant

FSAO vs Basic Encryption	18.92	<	2.34	0.998	Highly Significant
FSAO vs Differential Privacy	12.45	<	1.78	0.992	Highly Significant
FSAO vs Byzantine Resilience	8.34	<	1.23	0.967	Highly Significant
Balanced vs High Security	5.67	0.023	0.89	0.845	Significant

6.4 Privacy-Utility Trade-off

Table 7: Differential Privacy Trade-off Analysis

Privacy Budget (ϵ)	Model Accuracy (%)	Privacy Protection	Utility Loss (%)	Privacy-Utility Score
∞ (No Privacy)	95.6 \pm 1.2	0.00	0.0	0.000
10.0	94.8 \pm 1.3	0.45	0.8	0.356
5.0	93.7 \pm 1.5	0.67	1.9	0.503
2.0	92.1 \pm 1.7	0.82	3.5	0.672
1.0	90.3 \pm 1.9	0.91	5.3	0.827
0.5	87.6 \pm 2.2	0.96	8.0	0.922
0.1	82.4 \pm 2.7	0.99	13.2	0.980

6.5 Trust Management Performance

Table 8: Trust Management Effectiveness

Trust Model	Accuracy (%)	Convergence Time (rounds)	False Positive Rate (%)	Adaptation Speed	Scalability	Overall Score
Simple Weighted	76.3 \pm 4.2	45 \pm 8	18.7 \pm 3.4	0.45	0.89	0.623
Bayesian	82.4 \pm 3.7	32 \pm 6	12.3 \pm 2.8	0.67	0.76	0.734
Fuzzy Logic	85.6 \pm 3.2	28 \pm 5	9.8 \pm 2.3	0.72	0.82	0.789
Blockchain-based	91.2 \pm 2.4	18 \pm 4	5.6 \pm 1.7	0.85	0.68	0.856

FSAO (Proposed)	94.5 ± 1.8	12 ± 3	3.4 ± 1.2	0.92	0.91	0.923
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6.6 Scalability Under Security Constraints

Table 9: Scalability Analysis with Security Overhead

Network Size	Security Level	Throughput (kbps)	Latency (ms)	Energy Overhead (%)	Security Maintenance	Scalability Factor
100 nodes	Basic	245.6 ± 12.3	45.3 ± 3.2	8.3 ± 1.2	0.856	0.945
	Medium	198.7 ± 15.4	67.8 ± 4.5	15.6 ± 2.3	0.923	0.867
	High	156.8 ± 18.9	89.4 ± 5.7	23.4 ± 3.4	0.967	0.789
500 nodes	Basic	234.5 ± 14.2	56.7 ± 4.1	9.8 ± 1.5	0.823	0.912
	Medium	187.6 ± 17.8	78.9 ± 5.3	17.8 ± 2.8	0.889	0.834
	High	145.6 ± 21.3	112.3 ± 6.9	26.7 ± 4.1	0.945	0.756
1000 nodes	Basic	223.4 ± 16.7	67.8 ± 5.2	11.2 ± 1.8	0.789	0.878
	Medium	176.5 ± 20.1	89.4 ± 6.4	19.8 ± 3.2	0.856	0.801
	High	134.5 ± 24.5	134.5 ± 8.2	29.3 ± 4.8	0.912	0.723

7. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS

7.1 Convergence Guarantees

Theorem 2: Federated Learning Convergence

Under the proposed FSAO framework with Byzantine-resilient aggregation and differential privacy, the federated learning process converges to a stationary point of the global objective function with high probability.

Proof: Let w^t be the global model at iteration t . The update rule with secure aggregation:

$$w^{t+1} = w^t - \eta_t \tilde{g}^t \quad (21)$$

where \tilde{g}^t is the securely aggregated gradient. Under standard smoothness and bounded variance assumptions, and with properly chosen learning rates, we have:

$$\lim_{t \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}[\|\nabla \mathcal{L}(w^t)\|^2] = 0 \quad (22)$$

The Byzantine resilience ensures that corrupted gradients don't dominate the aggregation, while differential privacy adds bounded noise that doesn't affect convergence.

7.2 Security Guarantees

Theorem 3: Privacy Guarantee

The proposed FSAO framework satisfies (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy with carefully calibrated noise addition in the federated learning process.

Proof: Using the Gaussian mechanism and moments accountant, we can bound the privacy loss over T iterations:

$$\epsilon = O(q\sqrt{(T \log(1/\delta))/\sigma}) \quad (23)$$

where q is the sampling probability and σ is the noise scale. By properly choosing σ , we achieve the desired (ϵ, δ) -privacy guarantee.

7.3 Complexity Analysis

Theorem 4: Computational Complexity

The time complexity of FSAO per federated round is $O(Md + M \log M + B)$, where M is the number of clients, d is model dimension, and B is blockchain operations.

Proof: The complexity breakdown:

- Local computation: $O(Md)$ for model updates
- Secure aggregation: $O(M \log M)$ for Byzantine-resistant aggregation
- Trust management: $O(B)$ for blockchain operations
- Total: $O(Md + M \log M + B)$

8. DISCUSSION

8.1 Performance-Security-Trust Trade-offs

The experimental results reveal fundamental trade-offs:

- **Security vs Performance:** Increased security measures introduce 12-29% performance overhead
- **Privacy vs Utility:** Stronger privacy protection reduces model accuracy by 3-13%
- **Trust vs Efficiency:** Comprehensive trust management increases computational complexity

8.2 Optimal Operating Points

Based on comprehensive analysis, we identify optimal configurations:

1. **High-Security Applications:** Financial data, yield predictions - Use FSAO High Security
2. **Balanced Operations:** General farming data - Use FSAO Balanced
3. **Performance-Critical:** Real-time control systems - Use Medium security with selective protection

8.3 Practical Implications

For agricultural IoT practitioners:

- **Risk Assessment:** Quantitative framework for security risk evaluation
- **Cost-Benefit Analysis:** Clear metrics for security investment decisions
- **Compliance Guidance:** Meets agricultural data protection requirements

8.4 Limitations and Challenges

- **Computational Overhead:** Security mechanisms increase resource requirements
- **Implementation Complexity:** Requires expertise in cryptography and distributed systems
- **Standardization Gaps:** Lack of standardized security protocols for agricultural IoT

9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

9.1 Summary of Contributions

This research has presented a comprehensive security-aware optimization framework for agricultural IoT networks:

1. Developed Federated Security-Aware Optimization (FSAO) framework
2. Established mathematical foundations for performance-security-trust trade-offs
3. Implemented and validated Byzantine-resilient federated learning
4. Provided quantitative analysis of security overhead and benefits
5. Delivered practical guidelines for secure agricultural IoT deployments

9.2 Key Findings

- FSAO achieves 89.7-96.8% attack detection accuracy across various attack types
- Security introduces 12.5% average performance overhead with FSAO

- Optimal privacy-utility trade-off at $\epsilon = 1.0-2.0$ for agricultural applications
- Trust management accuracy of 94.5% with rapid convergence

9.3 Future Research Directions

1. **Adaptive Security:** Machine learning-based dynamic security adjustment
2. **Quantum-Resistant Cryptography:** Preparing for future cryptographic threats
3. **Cross-Domain Security:** Extending framework to other IoT domains
4. **Real-time Threat Intelligence:** Continuous security monitoring and adaptation
5. **Standardization Efforts:** Contributing to agricultural IoT security standards

The FSAO framework provides a solid foundation for building secure, efficient, and trustworthy agricultural IoT systems, enabling the full potential of smart agriculture while addressing critical security concerns.

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APPENDIX A: INDEX OF MATHEMATICAL CONCEPTS AND SYMBOLS

Table 10: Mathematical Symbols and Notation

Symbol	Description
N	Set of agricultural IoT networks, $N = \{N_1, N_2, \dots, N_m\}$
\mathcal{D}_i	Local dataset of network i
W	Model parameters across federated learning rounds
S	Security configuration parameters
$\mathcal{P}(W)$	Performance objective function (accuracy, latency, throughput)
$\mathcal{S}(W)$	Security risk measure function
$\mathcal{T}(S)$	Trust metric function
$\lambda_p, \lambda_s, \lambda_t$	Trade-off coefficients for performance, security, and trust
$\alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3$	Weights for security risk components
$\mathcal{L}(w)$	Global loss function in federated learning
$\mathcal{L}_i(w)$	Local loss function for client i

ϵ, δ	Privacy parameters in (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy
T_{ij}	Trust value between node i and j
g_i	Gradient of client i
\tilde{g}_i	Perturbed gradient with differential privacy noise
σ	Noise scale parameter in differential privacy
Δ_2	L2-sensitivity of gradient computation
$\alpha \mathcal{M}(\lambda)$	Moments accountant function for privacy composition
$w_{(i)j}$	Ordered statistics of parameter j across clients
T_i^t	Trust value of node i at time t
η_t	Learning rate at iteration t
f_1, f_2, f_3	Objective functions in multi-objective optimization
w_1, w_2, w_3	Weights in scalarization of multi-objective optimization
$\mathcal{A}_d, \mathcal{A}_a$	Action sets of defender and attacker in game theory
u_d, u_a	Utility functions of defender and attacker
R_d, C_d, L_d	Reward, cost, and loss functions of defender
V	Value of the security game (Minimax value)
M	Number of clients in federated learning
d	Dimension of the model parameters
B	

B Appendix B: Security Proofs and Analysis**B.1 Differential Privacy Proof**

Privacy Guarantee Proof. The Gaussian mechanism applied to gradients ensures (ϵ, δ) -differential privacy by adding noise scaled to the L2-sensitivity Δ_2 :

$$\sigma = (\Delta_2 \sqrt{(2 \log(1.25/\delta))}) / \epsilon \quad (24)$$

The moments accountant composes privacy loss across iterations, providing tight privacy bounds.

B.2 Byzantine Resilience Analysis

Theorem B.1 (Byzantine Resilience). The proposed aggregation rule is resilient to up to f Byzantine clients out of M total clients, provided $M > 3f$.

Proof. The trimmed mean aggregation removes the f smallest and f largest values, eliminating the influence of Byzantine clients as long as they don't constitute more than one-third of the population.

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